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A THEORY OF THE STABILITY OF PUNISHMENT
ALFRED BLUMSTEIN* AND JACQUElINE COHEN**
One of the more interesting theses advanced by
Durkheim, and subsequently by others, is that
crime is a "normal" and not a pathological attribute of society "provided that it attains and does
not exceed a certain level for each social type." I
Durkheim meant by this that a particular level of
crime is "an integral part of all healthy societies." 2
Far from being some aberrant form of societal
maladjustment, it is a necessary result of the same
phenomena which promote and maintain social
solidarity.3
For Durkheim, the essential mechanism contributing both to the stability of a society and to
the natural occurrence of crime was the "collective
conscience" or "the totality of beliefs and sentiments common to average citizens of the same
society." 4 When these beliefs and sentiments are
held strongly by most of the members of a society,
they form the social glue which binds the individuals in the society together. Yet, because of the
unavoidable individual variations in the degree to
which these sentiments are held, there will always
be persons whose individual embodiment of the
collective conscience is insufficiently developed.
As a result, these persons will often engage in
actions which are a serious affront to the collective
conscience, and thereby defined as criminal.
The collective conscience, then, provides a
cognitive structure which serves as the basis for
* Director,
Urban Systems Institute, CarnegieMellon University.
** Research Assistant, Urban Systems' Institute,
Carnegie-Afellon University.

£ E.
DURKHEIM,
TiE RULES
OF SOCIOLOGICAL
M.THOD 66 (S.Solovav & J. Mueller transls. 1964).

Id. at 07.
•It should be emphasized that Durkheini was quick
to point out that societal normality should not be cotnfused with individual normality. While the existence of
some crime is normal for society, that does not mean
that the individual criminals are to be considered nornial. The fact that there are persons with poor control
meclanisns may be determined by the social structure,
but these persons are, nevertheless, maladjusted at the
level of the individual. Similarly, he maintains that
while crimc is nornmal that does not mean that it should
not be regarded with displeasure. Just as a pain is a
normal, yet uncomfortable attribute for biological
organisms, so crime is a normal, but abhorrent feature
of social life.
I E. DURKHEIM, TnE DivisIoN OF LABOR IN SOCIETY
79 (G.Simpson transl. 1964).
2

organizing individuals into a collectivity by pro-

viding them with a group identity. At the same
time this structure partitions the class of possible
and actual behaviors into those which are acceptable and those which are unacceptable, thereby
creating the possibility of crime. That is, actions
can only be deemed as criminal in the context oi a
body of rules held in common and governing the
way men live together.
One of the more recent attempts to document
this Durkheimian notion is the work of-Kai Erikson. 5 Once again, the presence of crime in societies
is regarded as natural and emanating from the
same process which preserves s-ocial stability.
Erikson, however, speaks of this fundamental
process in the less esoteric terms of boundary
maintenance, which is the continual clarification
of the normative outlines of a particular social
group. As the cultural integrity of the group is
specified and reinforced, the phenomenon of crime
is also born.
In addition to accounting for the origin of crime,
both Durkheim and Erikson outline the subsequent
functional role of crime, or more accurately of the
social reaction to crime, for a social group. At the
same time that crime arises out of the mechanism
for social solidarity, the reaction to crime also
contributes to the maintenance of that social
solidarity-. As the society acts to punish the criminal, it also articulates the sentiments or norms
characteristic of the society and reinforces them
in its members. Thus, not only is crime in a society
natural, but the response to it serves a useful
purpose by continually clarifying and reaffirming
the essential beliefs which define that society.
An important corollary to the notion that crime
is both natural and functional for social life is that
the extent of crime in any particular social group
will generally be maintained at a specific level.
While the optimal level may vary with social
type, the observed level-in any given group will
rarely fall short of or exceed the relevant optimum.
Durkheim even suggests that it may be possible to
specify exactly the optimum level of crime for the
various social types. 6 Furthermore, Erikson's
K. ElzKsoN,

6E.

TIE WAYWARD PURITA.s
DURKIHEIM, supra note 1, at 66.

3-29 (Ooo).
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work includes an attempt to offer some empirical
evidence for this claim.'
In this paper, the preceding analysis of the
existence of stable levels of crime will be critically
re-examined and an alternative position about the
constancy of punishinent will be offered. It is our
contention that in their discussions of criminality
and deviance both Durkheim and Erikson were
not referring to the class of all acts which would
be considered criminal or deviant if discovered.
Rather, they were concerned with only those acts
which are publicly recognized as criminal (deviant)
and punished in some way. An alternative account
of the stability of punishment is then developed
by formulating the phenomenon in terms of a
homeostatic process. Finally the analysis will be
subjected to empirical testing using data from the
United States and Norway.

Tim

stable levels of crime, are referring only to those
crimes which come to public attention through the
punishment of the wrongdoer. For example, Durkheim stated that "an act is criminal when it offends
strong and defined states of the collective conscience." 8 Similarly, Erikson maintained that
"deviance is not a property inherent in. any particular kind of behavior; it is a property conferred
upon that behavior by the people who come into
direct or indirect contact with it." 9 Furthermore,
for both men a crime is known by the characteristic
reaction to it, namely its punishment. In each case,
the primary concern is with crimes for which there
is a public awareness of and response to the act.
The level of crime theyspeak of, then, includes only
those acts which are publicly recognized as crimes
and punished accordingly. Hence, it is not the
level of actual criminal behavior which is stable,
but rather the level of punished criminal acts.

STABILITY OF PuNIsmi E '
A BEHAVIOR DISTRIBUTION AND

At first glance the notion that there is a stable
PuNIsHmENT THRESHoLDs
level of crime for any society seems to have some
In order to explore the interaction between
clear empirical implications which can be examined. A closer look, however, reveals that there behavior and its punishment, we posit a statistical
are enormous difficulties attending the measure- distribution of general form, fn(x), representing
ment of levels of crime. In the strict sense, the the distribution of crime-related behavior in a
level of crime would have to include any act which society. The notion of such a distribution is not
0
is a violation of some criminal statute. This is, new; it has been used and discussed by Cavan
however, extremely difficult if not impossible to and by Wilkins. The basic concept of the distribution reflects the diversity of conduct in any
determine.
In the first place, not all crimes can be detected. society, ranging from the severely criminally
When a distinction is drawn between crimes with deviant to the compulsively moralistic. The general
victims, such as assault and robbery, and private structure of this distribution is depicted in Figure
crimes, such as prohibited narcotics use or sexual 1. For simplicity, we initially consider only the
practices between consenting adults, it is apparent one-dimensional distribution. The actual distributhat in the absence of extensive spying or self- tion is, of course, far more complex. The FBI, for
reporting, most private crimes will go undetected. example, uses 29 crime types in its Uniform Crime
There are also an indeterminate number of victim Reports, and even these are highly aggregated.
We can hypothesize that in this behavior space
crimes which are never reported (this is most
a
society establishes a boundary threshold, B0 ,
common in the case of rape). Furthermore, even
in the cases where crimes are detected, there are which defines unacceptable or criminal behavior,
wide variations in the degree of enforcement and that is, individuals who engage in behavior B > B0
in some cases a known infraction is completely are deemed to be punishable. We might introduce
ignored by the authorities. Thus, while the leviel here a punishment severity function, g(B), which
of reported or detected crimes can be determined is monotonic increasing with B, to reflect the
with some effort, there is no way of knowing exactly expected severity of the punishment to be imposed
how many crimes have been perpetrated without on an individual convicted of behavior B.
Under this model, we can then denote the
public awareness. It is, therefore, uninformative
8
E. DUEXmH,
supra note 4, at 80 (emphasis added).
to speak of a stable level of crime in this strict
9K. EgXISON, supra note 5, at 6 (emphasis in origisense.
There are indications in Durkheim's and Erik- nal).
10R. Cavan, The Concepts of Tolerance and Contrason's works that both men, when they speak of culture as Applied to Delinquency, in 2 SOCIOLOGICAL Q.
243-58 (1961).
" L. WILIUNS, SOcIAL DEVANCE (1964).
7 K. EanxsoN, supra note 5, at 163-81.
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punishment delivered by the society as the followinglintegral:
,=

L

g(x)C(x)fB(x) dx

(1)

where C(B) is the probability of the arrest and
conviction of someone who has engaged in behavior
B. This integral represents the gross punishment
meted out by the society. If C(B) represented the
rate of conviction of people engaged in behavior
B, then the integral a would represent a rate (say
an annual rate) of punishment.
We hypothesize here that in a given society,
during a relatively stable period, there is a balance
of forces that maintains a fairly constant. The
rationale for this argument is fundamentally that
the level of punishment in a society is homeostatic.
That is, there are a variety of processes in the
society which operate to maintain a constant level
of punishment, and this level adapts to changing
levels of actual crimes as reflected in shifts in the
behavior distribution. Under this hypothesis, if
behavior were to become less deviant through a
decrease in the occurrence of infractions (i.e., a
shift to the left in the behavior distribution), an
issue explored by both Durkheim 12 and Erikson, 13
then the society would respond according to
Durkheim's model by re-defining previously minor
infractions as crimes, and punishing these. The
result would be the stable maintenance of a reasonable amount of punishment.
In this process, for instance, if a(Bo) decreases
as a result of the behavior shift, then we would see
the threshold reestablished to a new value,
Bo' < B0 , which encompasses more types of behavior as crimes, so that a'(Bo') = a(Bo) = a.
2 E. DuRxHEiM, =pra note 1.
'3K. ER1RBON, supra note S.

On the other hand, if the population were to
become more deviant through a shift of the distribution to the right, then the society can choose
to retain the same punishment thresholds, B0 ,
and accept the consequently higher values of
punishment, a' > a. Alternatively, the society
could accommodate to the shift by revising its
standards toward greater leniency. It does so by
creating new thresholds, Be > Bo, or by creating
revised punishment procedures and adjusting
these such that the punishment integral, a, remains
constant. Thus:

a --f g(x)C(x)fn(x)
=

(2)

J1 g'(x)C'(x)f'B(x) dx

The social factors accounting for this hypothesized withdrawal reaction could certainly include
economic considerations. Increased punishment
implies increased expenditures for processing and
confinement as well as lost economic activity of
those punished, and the society may be unwilling
to undertake this increased economic burden. But
there would also be considerations of social stability, which try to avoid alienating too large a
portion of the population from the society by
labeling them and their associates as deviant, and
thereby risking the fundamental stability of the
society.
IMPRISONMENT RATE AS A MEASURE

OF PUNISMIENT
While the argument for a stable a may well be
reasonable, it is empty without some empirical
validation, which requires indications of a society's
punishment behavior. There could be many such
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ANN.UATL I3PImsoNMrNT RATE IN Tm UImD STATES: 1930-70
indicators. Among the possibilities are arrest rate,
conviction rate, imprisonment rate, and prison
populations. We first explore the imprisonment
rate and its time history as a measure of punishment.
Even if these data prove to be stable, however,
this would still fall short of definitive proof of the
argument for a stable a. First, punishment takes
many forms in a society, and each form has its
characteristic severity. In addition to prisons, there
are juvenile institutions, mental institutions, and
various forms of community supervision and
restraint. Even prior to conviction, arrest and trial
represent punishment in themselves. Nevertheless,
we believe that the severity of punishment in
prison sufficiently dominates these other forms to
warrant principal attention initially. If the imprisonment data are found to be reliable and the
process is found to be stable, then it would be
appropriate to explore these other forms of punishment to determine the stability of their time
trends.
Figure 2 depicts the imprisonment rate in the
United States in prisoners per 100,000 population
for the period 1930-1970.11 It can be seen from
,U. S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL HISTORY OF
SUNIrrED STATES FROm COLONIAL TnExs TO PRESENT
(1960). U. S. Dm'T or ConmmRE, STATISTICAL AB-

Figure 2 that over that period the imprisonment
rate was reasonably constant, having an average
value of 110.2 prisoners per 100,000 population
and a standard deviation during that time (as
shown by the dotted lines) of 8.9 prisoners per
100,000 population. The coefficient of variation is
thus 8.1 percent. The stability of the time series
is especially noteworthy when it is considered that
the population of the United States increased by
over 50 percent in this same period.
The anomalous points are principally those
during World War II (when the military represented an available alternative for many who might
otherwise have been in prison). Somewhat less
apparent is explanation for the peak around 1940.
Were the peak to have been in 1940 alone, then
the completeness of the census data for that year
might have been blamed. The peak, however,
spreads from 1938 to 1941, and so it could have
been a depression aftermath effect, a war precursor, or simply a smoothing factor applied to
smooth out a real 1940 peak. Even when these
anomalies are included, however, the rate remains
surprisingly stable.
The stability is more apparent in Figure 3, in
sTRAcT or THE UNIED STATEs-1970 (1970); U. S.
DEPT or CoMRrcE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT or TnE
UN=TED STATEs-1972 (1972).
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which the data for the years 1938-1945 have been
dropped. The slightly revised mean is thus 109.6;
the standard deviation drops to 5.9, and the coeffident of variation is 5.4 percent.
It is interesting to note that the imprisonment
rate since 1961 has shown a distinct downward
trend. This is in marked contrast to the 31 percent
increase in reported arrests between 1960 and
1970. One possible explanation for the declining
imprisonment rate could be saturation of existing
institutions. It might be that all the available
prison cells are filled, and the increasing population
divided into the fixed number of prisoners would
cause the rate to decline. It turns out, however, as
shown in Table 1, that even the absolute number
of prisoners has been declining since 1961. Furthermore, there is considerable evidence that prisons
in the U.S. are far from saturated. In fact, there
has been an increasing tendency throughout most
of the nation for shorter prison sentences, for more
use of probation and for other forms of community
supervision.
CROSS-CULTURAL COMPARISON

It is reasonable to expect that even if the value
of a is constant, its value would vary from one
society to another. One would expect, in particular

that a more homogeneous society, with less variability in its behavior distribution would have an
imprisonment rate significantly lower than a more
heterogeneous society that is otherwise comparable. This argument derives from a consideration of
the distance in the behavior distribution. An
individual with behavior B, < B 2 is presumed to
reject B2 and to exert some pressure for punishment
of B2. For a fixed B1 , this pressure is hypothesized
to be a monotonic increasing function h(D) of the
distance D = B2 - B1 . As the variance of the
behavior distribution increases, there is a greater
frequency of the larger distances, and hence a
higher imprisonment rate.
Similarly, one would expect that in two otherwise similar societies, the more permissive would
have a lower a.Here, the two societies differ in
their h(D) function, with the operational definition
of "society 1 is more permissive than society 2"
being that hi(D) < h2(D).
With respect to a punitive society, it is less
dear how its punishment rate would respond. It
might be that a "disciplining" society would have
a higher value of a because it punishes more
severely (i.e., a higher value for the h function) or
it might have a lower value because its people are
more disciplined, (i.e., the variance of the fB(x)
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TABLE 1
UNiTED STArES
Prison
Population

U.S.
Pop ulation*
(in Thousands)
I*

1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950

127,495
137,082
137,183
136,947
138,220
144,665
143,573
149,357
159,382
161,075
173,706
165,439
150,384
137,220
132,356
133,649
140,079
151,304
155,977
163,749
166,165

Piuso PopuLAioNs: 1930-1970*

Prisoner
Rate
per 100,000
I

I

123,188
124,149
124,949
125,690
126,484
127,362
128,181
128,961
129,964
131,028
132,122
133,402
134,860
136,739
138,397
139,928
141,389
144,126
144,631
149,188
151,683

Year

Prison
Population

U.S.
Population"
(in Thousands)

Prisoner
Rate
Per 100,000

165,680
168,233
173,579
182,901
185,915
189,575
195,414
205,493
207,446
212,953
220,149
218,830
217,283
214,336
210,895
199,654
194,896

154,360
157,020
159,636
162,417
165,270
168,174
171,229
174,882
177,830
180,671
183,691
186,538
189,242
191,889
194,303
196,560
198,712
200,706
202,677
204,879

107.3
107.1
108.7
112.6
112.5
112.7
114.1
118.8
117.7
118.6
120.8
118.3
115.7
112.6
109.5
102.7
99.1
(98.1)***
97.6
96.7

I'

103.5
110.4
109.8
109.0
109.3
113.6
112.0
115.8
122.6
122.9
131.5
124.0
111.5
100.4
95.6
95.5
99.1
105.0
107.8
109.8
109.5

196,007
196,429

* See footnote 14, supra, for the three sources of data in this table.
** Including Armed Forces Overseas.

***The prison population and rate for 1968 were unavailable. The rate was, therefore, estimated from the curve.
function has been reduced). The introduction of
punitive operations to a previously more permissive
society would be likely to generate immediately
a higher value of a. As stability was reached, then
deterrence would shift the behavior distribution
to the left, lowering a as a result. These dynamics
during a period of instability require further
exploration.
We have begun to explore the cross-cultural
aspects of this issue. Professor Nils Christie of the
University of Oslo has collected and provided us
with some of his data on Norwegian prisons. The
imprisonment rates for Norway for 1880 to 1964
are presented in Figure 4.15 The Norway data cover
85 years, a considerably longer time span than the
U.S. data. Again, the stability is dear, although
less striking than in the U.S. data. The mean
imprisonment rate is 52.5 prisoners per 100,000
population, with a standard deviation of 8.2 and a
coefficient of variation of 15.6 percent. As was
anticipated, the imprisonment rate is significantly

lower than in the United States, presumably at
least in part because of the greater homogeneity
of the Norweigian population.
Similar comparisons are needed for other countries. Review of Christie's E data for other Scandinavian countries seems to show effects similar to
those for Norway. Data from other countries are
needed to provide an appropriate mix of cultural
environments, historical trends, and characteristic
levels of punishment.

IsLetter from Nils Christie to Alfred Blumstein,
May 24, 1971.

DIAVIAN

MULTmID

NSIONALITY Op T=E BnnAvioR
DISmIBuTIoN

We can now turn to an exploration of the multidimensional character of the behavior distribution.
In view of the variety of behavior labeled and
treated as "crime," it is necessary to deal with the
behavior variable, B, as a vector variable. The 29
separate categories of offenses in the Uniform
16 N. Christie, Changes in Penal Values, 2 Sc
STUiES iN CRxIoMoOGY-AsPEcrs
SocIAL CONTROL ixWEARE STATES (1968).

x-

or

A. BLUMSTEIN & JACQUELINE COHEN

[Vol. 64

6060

---

-

-

------------

-

-- -

-

50
40
'30-

20O

1,= 52.5
10

a
1880

85

0

s

19o0

's

i'o

As

Frinua

10

2

'O

=

3s

8.2

do

,5

5b

s

6b

6,

4

ANNUAL IapmsoNmENT RATE IN NORWAY: 1880-1964

Crime Reports, 17 for instance, include such internally diverse categories as other assaults, sex
offenses, disorderly conduct, and "all other offenses
(except traffic)."
Treating B as a vector requires a revision of
expression (1) as follows:
B1
•C(xi,

Boo
...

3

, x,)fn(xi, --- , x.) dx ...dx.

In this case, then, changes can occur along any
of the dimensions of the behavior distribution.
Thus, some actual crime rates can increase while
others decrease. More severe punishment can be
imposed on some crimes while others receive more
gentle treatment. In particular, since B0 is now a
vector of the form (Bo,, Bo2, .- , Bo.), there is a
wide range of choices in setting the individual
B0 components subject only to the requirement
expressed in equation (3) above that the total
integral be a. Thus, as the behavior distribution
shifts, the threshholds for some serious crimes, say
murder and robbery, can remain fairly constant,
7 FEDRAL BUREAU OP INvESTIGATION,

UNIyOIO

REPoRTs (1970). The categories used are the
following: murder and nonnegligent manslaughter;
manslaughter by negligence; forcible rape; robbery;
aggravated assault; burglary; larceny; auto theft;
other assaults; arson; forgery and counterfeiting;
fraud; embezzlement; stolen property; vandalism;
weapons; prostitution; sex offenses; narcotic drug laws;
gambling; offenses against family and children; driving
under the influence; liquor laws; drunkenness; disorderly conduct; vagrancy; all other offenses (except
traffic); suspicion; curfew.
ClR

while the B0 levels of some other components
change in order to maintain a constant a.
The prime candidates for more significant revision are the non-victim crimes. As the behavior
distribution shifts to the right (i.e., an increase
in the occurrence of criminal deviance), then the
society can become more lenient with respect to
such crimes. This leniency can take several forms.
The corresponding component of Bo can be increased so that only the more serious version of that
behavior is dealt with (e.g., narcotics traffic rather
than use). Alternatively, the severity of the punishment function, g(x), can be reduced by an increased
willingness on the part of prosecutors, judges, or
juries to drop charges or to use lesser charges.
Judges can reduce the punishment by more frequent use of probation or suspended sentences.
Prison sentences can be shortened by either
changes in sentencing by judges or earlier release on
parole. All of these serve to reduce the contribution
to a by those offenses on which adaptation occurs.
These effects can be explored with the arrest
data for 1960, 1965 and 1970 reported in the 1970
Uniform Crime Reports (Table 2). During the
period 1960 to 1970, there was an increase of 31
percent in reported arrests with an increase of
over 20 percent in the second half of the decade
alone. During this same decade, the number of
reported index crimes increased by 176 percent
and the crime rate per population increased by 144
percent. 8 Similar increases were reported for the
crimes of violence (156 percent and 126 percent)
181d. at 65.
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TABLE 2

TRENs IN UNITED STATES ARRESTS FOR SELECTED

CRIsx TYPES*
1970 Arrests8

Percentage Change in
Arrests

Crime Type
Number
(in thousands)

at/
100.000

1960-70b

Total
6,500.3 4,287.7 +31.0%
Violentd
241.9
159.6 +83.2
Propertyd
1,028.9
678.6 +87.4
Robbery
87.7
57.8 +120.2
Burglary
285.4
188.3 +61.6
Larceny
616.1
406.4 +108.2
Stolen Prop61.5
40.6 +358.5
erty
Narcotics
346.4
228.5 +740.6

195_700

+20.7%
+48.4
+40.5
+80.5
+32.4
+51.1
+206.3
+575.0

Prostitution

49.3

32.5

+57.6

+37.4

Liquor Laws

222.5

146.7

+58.8

+13.9

Sex Offenses

49.3

32.5

-23.3

-22.3

Gambling

84.8

55.9

-38.1

-28.6

Drunkenness 1,512.7

997.8

-14.4

-8.5

Disorderly
Cond.
Vagrancy
Suspicion
Family/
Children

589.6

388.9

+2.8

-6.4

101.1
70.2
56.6

66.7
46.3
37.3

-41.5
-56.4
-5.6

-17.2
-18.4
-15.7

* All crime types with a decrease in arrests are shown
in the table. Those crime types not shown changed at
rates similar to those indicated for the aggregated
categories of violent and property crimes.
The figures in each column are not directly comparable since they are based on different reporting populations. The 1970 arrest figures in columns 1 and 2 are
the most complete indicating arrest data from all
agencies reporting in 1970. The percentage changes
from 1960 to 1970 and from 1965 to 1970 use subsets
of this data. In each case only data available from those

agencies reporting in both years (1960 and 1970, or
1965 and 1970) are used. The percentage changes,
therefore, represent changes in the number of arrests
for comparable population bases.
a Source:

FEDERAL BUREAU

OF

IN VESTIGATION,

UNmroRm CRIME REPoRTs-1970 Table 23. See footnote 17 supra.
b Source: Id. at Table 24.
e Source: Id. at Table 25.
dThe category of violent crimes includes murder
and non-negligent manslaughter, negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery and aggravated assault.
Property crimes include burglary, larceny and auto
theft.

and for the crimes against property (180 percent
and 147 percent). There is considerable debate1 9
over how much of this increase is due to increases
in reporting rate, how much is due to the effects
of inflation (e.g., an increase in the price of bicycles
increases the number of index larcenies of $50 or
more), and how much is due to other non-behavioral shifts that cannot easily be calibrated.
Despite these uncertainties, it is generally accepted, as concluded by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration
of Justice, that:
1. The number of offenses-crimes of violence,
crimes against property, and most others as wellhas been increasing. Naturally, population growth
is one of the significant contributing factors in the
total amount of crime.
2. Most forms of crime-especially crimes
against property-are increasing faster than population growth. 20
These conclusions were reached in 1966, when the
reported crime rate increase was less than in the
remaining years of the decade. It can thus reasonably be asserted that there was a significant shift
to the right in the United States' behavior distribution during the 1960's.
Table 2 lists only a selection of the large majority
of the crime types for which reported arrests have
increased. It lists all seven of the 29 crime types
whose reported arrests have decreased: sex offenses, gambling, drunkenness, disorderly conduct,
vagrancy, suspicion, and offenses against family
and children. Aside from offenses against family
and children (which involve matters like non-support and desertion, and which may be more civil
than criminal in nature), these are all victimless
crimes, and are of the kind where the discretion
over B0 has the greatest flexibility.
The striking exception in this pattern of decline
in arrests for non-victim crimes is the violation of
narcotics and drugs laws for which arrests have increased by 740 percent over the entire decade and
by 575 percent over its last five years. This rate of
increase in the drug law arrests is clearly contradictory to the trends in the other victimless
10
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crimes. The explanation for this effect can only
result from a consideration of the dynamics of the
adaptation process. The shift of the Bo values in
response to shifts in the behavior distribution is
certainly not instantaneous. Rather, the B, shift
results from various forms of recognition of the
need for the shift, and a subsequent accommodation.
Thus, it may be hypothesized that during the
latter part of the sixties, drug abuse, including
marijuana and narcotics, expanded so rapidly (i.e.,
the behavior distribution rapidly moved to the
right on the narcotics-laws dimension) that any
revision of enforcement policies could not keep up
with that shift. The rapidity of the behavioral
shift is indicated by the fact that there was only
one narcotics arrest recorded in the Wolfgang
cohort of 9,945 Philadelphia boys who had amassed
10,214 arrests by the time they were 18 years old
in 1963.2
The sharp increase in drug law arrests has led
to a significant re-examination of the laws, and
several clear steps have been taken to increase Ba.
In the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 19 70 ' Congress changed possession
of marijuana for personal use from a felony to a
misdemeanor.u In 1972, the National Commission
on Marijuana and Drug Abuse recommended-that
possession of marijuana for personal use should no
longer be a federal or state offense 4 These moves
are clearly in the direction of a liberalized adaptation of Bo to the shifts in the behavior distribution, lagged perhaps by several years.
Thus, in the case of narcotics we see that a
transformation of the behavior distribution to the
right led to an increase in the punishment for drug
use, with an associated growth in a. A reaction
against this increase has led to the establishment
of new, more tolerant B, values. The dynamics of
this process, including assessment of the time lags
in the response system, still need further exploration.
The 359 percent increase in the number of arrests for stolen property is also illuminating. The
criminal justice system can maintain a constant
a, not only by moving Bo, but also by adjusting
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the severity of punishment, g(B), for a given
behavior. One of the ways this is accomplished is
by reducing the severity of the offense charged. In
many jurisdictions, an individual arrested for theft
is often charged with the trio of burglary, larceny
and receiving or possessing stolen property. Burglary requires the most rigid standards of proof
for conviction and carries the most severe sentences, and the opposite is true for stolen-goods
offenses. In the face of a general property-crime
arrest rate increase of about 8 percent per year
over the decade, and an increase over the decade
of 62 percent in burglary arrests and 108 percent in
larceny arrests, the rate of increase in stolen-goods
arrests has been about 359 percent. Thus, it would
appear that many individuals who formerly would
have been charged with burglary or larceny are
being charged with the less serious offense of receiving stolen goods.
This whole process of a-stabilization is fundamentally an implicit one. There is no individual or
body within the society that says "our a is too high,
let us revise our g(B) function or our Bo's." Rather,
this description merely reflects the marginal
changes resulting from an intricate, continuous
process in which a complex of social forces, continually in conflict, win and lose a series of small
battles. Certainly judicial authority represents a
significant factor in these outcomes. The sequence
of liberal criminal law decisions of the Warren
Court did their share to maintain a. By making it
harder to convict a defendant, they presumably reduced the conviction function, C(B). One of the
results of this was an increase in the need for
better evidence to warrant conviction, and the
consequent use of lesser arrest charges like receiving stolen goods.
POLIcY CONJECrURES AND SUMMARY

Evidence seems to be developing that the United
States crime rate increases of the 1960's are leveling
off and may even begin to decline. It is still an open
question how much of this can be attributed to
demographic effects (e.g., aging of the population)
and how much to resources committed to the en21M. WoiLGANG, R. FIGLIo & T. SELLIN, DE- forcement or prevention activities engendered by
the public concern over the problem of crime. If,
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STABILITY OF PUNISHMENT

The initial consequences of the shift to the left
would first be a temporary reduction in a, followed
by an adaptation to more severe punishment and
more rigid threshholds to restore a to its normal
value. Statements by public officials in early 1973
have called for life imprisonment and mandatory
minimum sentences for certain offenses like trafficking in narcotics. Shifts to greater restrictiveness
in the Bo thresholds are also possible. There may
be a tightening in the recently loosened controls
over the victim crimes. It may even be more likely
that some forms of behavior like ecological nuisance
activity will become increasingly of concern to the
criminal law. It is unlikely that the larger criminal
justice establishment created with federal funds
through the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration will let itself become bored from inactivitv. If other service activities are not found
into which to divert those resources, then they are
likely to assure that a is at least maintained.
If, on the other hand, the behavior distribution
continues to shift to the right, then we can reasonably expect to see increasing pressure for the
decriminalization of the victimless crimes.
In this paper, we have critically reexamined
Durkheim's claim of the existence of stable levels
of crime and offered an alternative argument for
the stability of punishment. We have presented a
theoretical structure which characterizes deviant
behavior and society's response to it in terms of a
multidimensional behavior distribution which can
vary over time. We have hypothesized and provided some empirical evidence to support a conservation theory that suggests that society tries to
impose a fairly constant level of punishment, at a
rate a, and that the behavior it punishes responds
to shifts in the behavior distribution. The punish-

ment should vary between societies and should
reflect consideration of a society's homogeneity
and its permissiveness toward deviance.
As the behavior distribution of the society becomes more deviant, then in order to maintain a
constant a, there must be a slackening of the
behavior thresholds that warranted punishment
in the past, or a reduction in the severity of the
punishment for a given offense. Since these changes
in thresholds or in severity can be chosen reasonably independently, we would expect to see more
flexibility in the treatment of the victimless crimes
than of the victim crimes, and these changes are in
fact reflected in arrest data.
Clearly, further development of this theory is
needed. There should be consideration of the differences in the behavior of different demographic
groups and their differing vulnerability to punishment. Further development is needed to identify
factors that influence the characteristic punishment
rate of a society. Dynamic analysis is needed to account for the time lags in the response process, and
the effect this may have on cyclical aspects of the
punishment rate.
More fundamentally, the theory still requires
further empirical validation. Some account must
be taken of other modes of punishment than imprisonment. The constancy of the punishment
rate must be tested in settings other than the
United States and Norway. And the response process shown with United States arrest data for
victimless crimes must also be tested in other
societies. Based on the limited validation thus far
available, however, this theoretical construct appears to be an important extension and significant
modification of the perceptions of Durkheim as
evolved by Erikson.

